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National Collegiate Athletic Association v.
Tarkanian: A Death Knell for the
Symbiotic Relationship Test?
Introduction
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
that "[n]o State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."' It has been settled for over a century that
fourteenth amendment protection applies only against state action.2
When a governmental entity allegedly violates a person's due process
rights, the state action inquiry is a mere formality.3 When a private
party commits the challenged act, however, the question whether the
state was sufficiently involved for the act to constitute state action has
proven highly problematic.4
National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian,5 decided in
December 1988, involved a public university's suspension of one of its
coaches at the behest of a private association. The Supreme Court held
that the association was not a state actor for fourteenth amendment due
process purposes. In framing its due process inquiry, the Court asked
whether "'the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal
right [can] be fairly attributable to the State.' "6 The Court conducted a
fact-based analysis of the relationship between the state actor, the Uni-
versity of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV), and the private association, the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). The Court con-
cluded that the relationship was too tenuous to classify the association as
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 sets forth the statutory remedy for
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. It provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979).
2. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11, 21 (1883); see also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (stating that the "[Fourteenth] Amendment erects no shield against merely
private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.").
3. See Glennon & Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State
Action"Requirement, 1976 Sup. Cr. REv. 221, 228.
4. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONrrrUTIONAL LAW 1689-90 (2d ed. 1988).
5. 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988).
6. Id. at 465 (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)).
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a state actor.7
Justice Stevens, writing for the five-to-four majority, relied primarily
on the traditional "nexus' 8 and "public fumction" 9 tests of state action in
his decision. His rejection of the state action claim perpetuated the
Court's recent trend constricting the scope of the state action doctrine."0
The Burger Court found the nexus test a particularly useful tool in
its series of "ad hoe efforts to limit the reach of state action." 1 Given
Justice Rehnquist's role as "Burger Court state action expositor," 2 it is
not surprising that this trend should continue after his elevation to Chief
Justice. 13
The traditional state action tests14 are especially well suited to the
steady erosion of the state action doctrine, because they themselves are
essentially case-by-case inquiries.15 Indeed, writers have sharply criti-
cized these tests because a court can easily manipulate them to reach the
court's predetermined conclusion. 6 Tarkanian is a prime example of
this type of manipulation.
This Comment examines the Tarkanian Court's use of the nexus
and public function tests in its state action analysis. Part I traces the
historical background of the tests and their development into exacting
state action inquiries. Part I also demonstrates how easily a result-
minded court may exploit these tests. Part II describes the facts of
Tarkanian, focusing on the relationship between UNLV and the NCAA.
7. Id. at 463. The Court had accepted as given that "[i]n performing their official fun-
tions, the executives of UNLV unquestionably act under color of state law." Id at 457.
8. See infra notes 48-64 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
10. The Burger Court began this trend in the early 1970s. See Phillips, The Inevitable
Incoherence of Modern State Action Doctrine, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 683 (1984).
11. Id at 720.
12. Id at 713. Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinions in Jackson v. Metropoli-
tan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), and
Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), which, together, "severely qualified the the-
ory of significant state involvement." Stem, State Action, Establishment Clause, and Defama-
tion: Blueprints for Civil Liberties in the Rehnquist Court, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 1175, 1192
(1989). He also wrote the Court's opinion in Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), yet
another case in which the Court found no state action.
13. Stem, supra note 12, at 1192 (stating that "[w]ithout attributing inordinate impor-
tance to the role of Chief Justice Rehnquist, it can be said that his tenure on the Court has
coincided with a discernible retreat from the vision that had been manifested in the [state
action doctrine].").
14. See infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
15. See L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 1690.
16. See Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks,
130 U. PA. L. REv. 1296, 1325 (1982) (criticizing the state compulsion test); Stem, supra note
12, at 1221 (state action doctrine in general); Thompson, Piercing the Veil of State Action: The
Revisionist Theory and a Mythical Application to Self-Help Repossession, 1977 Wis. L. Rlv. 1,
22-23, 79 (state action doctrine in general); Comment, The State Action Doctrine in State and
Federal Courts, 11 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 893, 898 (1984) (symbiotic relationship test).
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The Court based its decision almost exclusively on this relationship. Part
II also presents the Court's holding of no state action and the dissent's
argument that the NCAA was indeed a state actor for fourteenth amend-
ment purposes.
Finally, Part III analyzes the Court's decision, positing that the
Tarkanian Court took advantage of the extreme flexibility of the state
action doctrine to justify its preconceived conclusion. Part III also ar-
gues that the facts of Tarkanian required the Court to find that the
NCAA was a state actor because it participated jointly with UNLV in
the challenged act. The Court ignored the realities of Tarkanian by
bending the tests to fit a predetermined conclusion. In the process, the
Court devalued both the nexus and public function tests as reliable
means of solving the state action problem and reaffirmed one commenta-
tors' description of the state action doctrine as a "conceptual disaster
area."
17
This Comment concludes that in cases like Tarkanian, where both
parties must participate in order to carry out the challenged act, a court
must find state action. The court's use of this "joint participation" stan-
dard will preclude it from resorting to the vague, easily manipulated
nexus and public function tests. Use of the joint participation standard
will avoid arbitrary decisions like Tarkanian.
I. Historical Background
A. Burton's Fact-based Analysis
State action analysis is highly fact-dependent.' 8 In Burton v. Wil-
mington Parking Authority, 9 Justice Clark, writing for the majority, said
that "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvi-
ous involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true
significance." 2°
In Burton, the Court found state action when the state used public
funds to build and maintain a parking garage that was used for public
purposes. The state leased commercial space within the garage to a pri-
vate restaurant that practiced racial discrimination. 2 The Court began
its state action analysis by warning that "to fashion and apply a precise
17. Black, Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81
HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967). More recently, Professor Christopher Stone remarked that
"[t]he whole state action area appears now, more than ever, a shambles." Stone, Corporate
Vices and Corporate Virtues: Do Public/Private Distinctions Matter?, 130 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1441,
1484 n.156 (1982).
18. Lewis, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authorit--A Case Without Precedent, 61
COLUM. L. Rrv. 1458, 1467 (1961).
19. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
20. Id. at 722.
21. Id. at 716.
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formula for recognition of state responsibility... is an 'impossible task'
which '[t]his Court has never attempted.' "22 The Court next focused on
the specifics of the relationship between the parties and concluded that
the relationship was sufficiently close to characterize the restaurant as a
state actor.
23
The Burton Court concluded by limiting its holding to the facts at
bar.24 The majority opinion stated that the state/private party relation-
ships that are covered by the Fourteenth Amendment "can be deter-
mined only in the framework of the peculiar facts or circumstances
present. ' 2' Burton has been criticized for its failure to establish even "a
minimum, tentative rule"26 to guide future courts struggling with the
state action problem.
27
B. The Traditional State Action Tests
Despite the extremely ad hoc nature of the state action inquiry after
Burton, the Court has relied increasingly on several broad tests to aid in
its state action analysis. 2' Depending on the facts of the case, a court
may invoke the "state compulsion" test,29 the "public function" test, 0
the "nexus" test,3 ' or any combination of the three.
32
1. The State Compulsion Test
The state compulsion test typically requires a finding of state action
when "the wrongdoer has been commanded or encouraged by govern-
ment to engage in the activity which has harmed the aggrieved party."33
Thus, state action has occurred when the private party was obeying a
statute, 4 or even a "custom having the force of law."35 In recent years,
22. Id. at 722 (quoting Kotch v. Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947)).
23. Id. at 723-25.
24. Id. at 725-26.
25. Id. at 726.
26. Lewis, supra note 18, at 1466.
27. Id. at 1462-63 & n.21; see also Zagrans, "Under Color of" What Law: A Recon-
structed Model of Section 1983 Liability, 71 VA. L. REv. 499, 503 (1985) (stating that "the
Court has succeeded only in sowing ambiguity and incoherence in section 1983 jurispru-
dence").
For a contrary viewpoint, see Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REv. 165,
199 (1985) (praising the Burton Court's "failure to formalize a rule").
28. See, eg., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982) (listing the various
state action tests).
29. See infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 48-64 and accompanying text.
32. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
33. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 432 (3d ed. 1986).
34. Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
35. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 171 (1970). Adickes held that if a lunch-
however, the Court has made the state compulsion test more rigorous.
This changing attitude is illustrated in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co.,36 the case that signaled the Burger Court's intent to limit the state
action doctrine.37 The plaintiff in Jackson brought a section 1983 suit
against the defendant private utility company for terminating her electri-
cal service, allegedly without giving her notice or an opportunity to be
heard and to pay her outstanding bills. The defendant held a certificate
of public convenience from the Pennsylvania Utility Commission. The
plaintiff argued that the defendant's termination of her service was
"'specifically authorized and approved'" by the Commission, 3 and was
therefore state action. The Jackson Court rejected this argument, ruling
that a state must actually order an act for there to be state action under
the state compulsion test. Mere passive approval is not enough.
2. The Public Function Test
The public function test, in theory, prevents the state from avoiding
constitutional liability by delegating its public functions to a private
party. If the state delegates a public function, the Court will deem the
ostensibly private party a state actor.39 The Court has had difficulty dis-
tinguishing public functions from functions that are inherently private
and therefore not restricted by the Fourteenth Amendment.4° For exam-
ple, in only eight years, the Court completely reversed itself on the ques-
tion of whether a privately owned shopping center performs a public
function. In Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley
Plaza,41 the Court held that a shopping center is the "functional
equivalent" of a business district in a company town-an entity that the
Court had already found to be a state actor.42 In 1976, after an interven-
ing case had failed to limit Logan Valley to its facts,43 the Court rejected
room's refusal to serve the plaintiff stemmed from a "state-enforced custom of segregating the
races in public restaurants," such refusal violated the plaintiff's due process rights. Id.
36. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
37. Phillips, supra note 10, at 704.
38. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 354 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 9-10, Jackson (No. 73-5845)).
The plaintiff argued that the defendant's termination of her service was "allowed by a provi-
sion of its general tariff filed with the Commission," and was therefore state action. Id at 348.
39. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 33, at 426.
40. Id.
41. 391 U.S. 308 (1968), overruled by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). Logan
Valley considered union picketing in front of a supermarket.
42. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 503 (1946).
43. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). The plaintiffs in Lloyd argued that by
refusing to permit them to distribute handbills in its shopping center, defendant corporation
had violated their first amendment rights. The Court rejected this argument. It distinguished
its holding in Logan Valley by stating that the picketing in that case was "directly related" to
the activities conducted in the shopping center, and that the picketers there had no reasonable
alternative means of conveying their message. Id at 563.
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Logan Valley outright.' The inherent vagueness of the public function
standard allowed the Court wide discretion in deciding exactly what
types of functions fall under the heading of state action.
As with the other state action standards, the Court recently limited
the scope of the public function standard. 5 In Jackson, for example, the
Court recognized state action when a private entity had exercised "pow-
ers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State."" Nevertheless, the
Court ruled that the provision of utility service was "not traditionally the
exclusive prerogative of the State."'4 7 Therefore, said the Court, the de-
fendant utility company was not subject to the Fourteenth Amendment.
This holding further narrowed the scope of the state action inquiry. The
Jackson Court exercised wide discretion in deciding what types of func-
tions are the state's exclusive prerogative.
3. The Nexus Test
a. Roots in the Symbiotic Relationship Test
Ironically, the nexus test used in Tarkanian traces its origins to Bur-
ton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,48 where the Court specifically lim-
ited its holding to the facts of the case.4 9 In Burton, the Court found the
privately owned restaurant to be a state actor when it leased its space
from the state.50 The Court aggregated the "incidental variety of mutual
benefits"51 enjoyed by both parties as a result of their association with
each other and concluded that there was state action 2 because the state
44. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). Like Logan Valley, Hudgens involved union
picketing of a store located within a shopping center. Unlike Logan Valley, however, the
Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments provided no protection to the picket-
ers' activities. Id. at 520-21.
45. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
46. 419 U.S. at 352.
47. Id. at 353.
48. 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961). In Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982),
the Court listed the various state action tests. It cited Burton as an example of a nexus test
case, presumably in reference to its "incidental variety of mutual benefits" language. See infra
note 51 and accompanying text. But, as if to acknowledge its own confusion, the Court stated
that "[w]hether these different tests are actually different in operation or simply different ways
of characterizing the necessarily fact-bound inquiry that confronts the Court in such a situa-
tion need not be resolved here." Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
49. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
51. Burton, 365 U.S. at 724. These mutual benefits included the convenience of parking
for the restaurant's customers which in turn was likely to increase demand for the state's
parking facilities. In addition, the restaurant would enjoy certain tax advantages due to its
obtainment of the lease from a tax-exempt government agency. Finally, the Court observed
that "profits earned by discrimination not only contribute to, but also are indispensable ele-
ments in, the financial success of a governmental agency." Id
52. Ia
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had "so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the
restaurant] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the chal-
lenged activity .... ."I'
Subsequent cases have referred to this search for mutual benefits as
the "symbiotic relationship" '  or "joint participation""5 test. Although
the Court has not explicitly rejected this test, recent decisions raising the
issue have uniformly found any symbiotic relationship between the par-
ties to be inconsequential for state action purposes. 6 In Jackson, the
Court summarily rejected the appellant's symbiotic relationship argu-
ments. The Court stated that Burton was limited to lessees of public
property.5 7 Because the appellee, a privately owned utility company, did
not lease its facilities from the state, Jackson did not meet the Burton
test." By the time the Court decided Tarkanian, the joint participation
inquiry was a virtual non-issue. Tarkanian made it even more so.59
b. The Nexus Test Today
The nexus standard, first articulated in Jackson," is ostensibly a less
demanding variant of the joint participation standard. In Jackson, Jus-
tice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, said "the inquiry must be
whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the chal-
lenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may
be fairly treated as that of the State itself."61 This formulation is ex-
tremely broad and may easily encompass situations in which the nexus
falls far short of actual joint participation. In Jackson, for example, the
Court reasonably could have found the state's licensure of the defendant
utility company a "sufficiently close nexus" to make the defendant a state
actor. Because the state had no actual involvement in defendant's deci-
53. Id.
54. The term was first used in Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972).
55. Cases and commentators frequently use the terms interchangeably. See, e.g., Frazier
v. Board of Trustees, 765 F.2d 1278, 1285 (5th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1142 (1986);
Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of Private Incarceration, 38 AM. U.L. REv. 531, 599-600
(1989); Spurlock, Liability of State Officials and Prison Corporations for Excessive Use of Force
Against Inmates of Private Prisons, 40 VAND. L. REv. 983, 1015 (1987); Weisburd, Candidate-
Making and the Constitution: Constitutional Restraints on and Protections of Party Nominating
Methods, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 213, 231 (1984).
56. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842-43 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S.
991, 1010-11 (1982); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357-58 (1974); Moose
Lodge, 407 U.S. at 175.
57. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 358.
58. Idl The Court also held that the state's regulation of the utility was not sufficient to
classify the state as a "joint venturer" with the utility. Id (quoting Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at
176-77).
59. See infra notes 126-28, 134-35, 159-60 and accompanying text.
60. 419 U.S. at 351.
61. Id
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sion to terminate plaintiff's service, however, a finding of joint participa-
tion would be unlikely.
It would be difficult to find a closer nexus between two parties than
their joint participation in the challenged act. But the Court's applica-
tion of the nexus test has proved very demanding.62 This effect results
largely from Jackson's tacit rejection of the Burton approach of aggregat-
ing the various state action factors and instead searching for state action
in each individual element of the case.63
Since Jackson, the public function test has become little more than
one persuasive factor to consider in the seriatim search for a nexus be-
tween the parties. In Blum v. Yaretsky, Justice Rehnquist, again writing
for the majority, declared that "the required nexus may be present if the
private entity has exercised powers that are 'traditionally the exclusive
prerogative of the state.' "61 Thus, using the Jackson seriatim approach,
a court theoretically could find that the public function test was satisfied,
but still conclude that any nexus between the parties was insufficient to
support a finding of state action.
II. Case Description
A. Relationship Between UNLV and the NCAA
Any state action analysis of Tarkanian must begin with an overview
of the relationship between UNLV and the NCAA because this relation-
ship is so central to the disposition of the state action question.
The NCAA is an unincorporated association comprised of about
960 members. 6 This membership includes the majority of American
public and private universities and four-year colleges with "major ath-
letic programs.",66 Every year, the membership gathers at a national con-
vention to determine NCAA policies.67 Between conventions, the
NCAA Council and various Council-appointed committees govern the
NCAA's affairs.68
One of the NCAA's primary policies is "to maintain intercollegiate
athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as
an integral part of the student body, and by so doing, retain a clear line of
demarcation between college athletics and professional sports., 69 In
62. See Phillips, supra note 10, at 704-05, 719.
63. Id. at 705. This adoption of a seriatim analysis was the basis for Justice Douglas'
dissent in Jackson. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 360 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
64. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1005 (1982) (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353) (em-
phasis added).




69. Id (quoting Joint Appendix at 80, Tarkanian (No. 87-1061)).
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connection with this purpose, the NCAA has enacted rules on such mat-
ters as eligibility standards and student-athlete recruitment.
70
NCAA policies are enforced by a Committee on Infractions which
has the authority to conduct investigations, to make findings regarding
alleged rule violations, and to "'impose appropriate penalties on a mem-
ber found to be in violation.' ,71 This Committee also has the power to
order a member institution to show cause why further sanctions should
not be incurred unless the member "imposes a prescribed discipline on
[its] employee."' 72 The Committee, however, has no authority to disci-
pline an institution's employees directly.73
UNLV is a branch of the University of Nevada, a state institution.74
The State of Nevada's constitution, statutes, and regulations govern the
university's operations.75 UNLV is a member institution of the
NCAA.76 As such, UNLV must comply with and enforce the NCAA's
rules77 and is "'expected to cooperate fully' with the administration of
the enforcement program.
'78
B. Facts of Tarkanian
Jerry Tarkanian, "college basketball's winningest coach,"' 79 turned
a mediocre team into one of the most successful teams in the country.
80
The UNLV basketball team's success also meant success for Tarkanian.
His annual salary at the time of trial was $125,000 plus various bo-
nuses.81 He also did product endorsements,82 had his own radio and tele-
vision shows,83 and wrote a commercially successful autobiography.8"
After conducting its own preliminary investigation, the NCAA's
Committee on Infractions notified UNLV of the commencement of an
"Official Inquiry" on February 25, 1976. The inquiry focused on alleged
70. Id.
71. Id. (quoting Joint Appendix at 98, Tarkanian (No. 87-1061)).
72. Id. at 457-58.
73. Id. at 458.
74. Id. at 457.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 456.
77. Id. at 457.
78. I& at 458 (quoting Joint Appendix at 97, Tarkanian (No. 87,1061)).
79. J. TARKANIAN & T. PLUTO, TARK-COLLEGE BASKETBALL'S WINNINGEST COACH
(1988).
80. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 456. When Tarkanian was appointed head coach in 1973,
UNLV had a 14-14 record. Four years later, it posted a 29-3 record and placed third in the
NCAA's national basketball tournament. I& In 1990, the team won the national tournament
by a record 30 points. Rhoden, N. C.A.A. Championship: Las Vegas Hits Jackpot in a Record
Runaway, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1990, at B9, col. 3 (late ed.).
81. 109 S. Ct. at 456 n.1.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See supra note 79.
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recruiting violations made by UNLV's basketball staff, including
Tarkanian. 5 The Committee requested that UNLV investigate all alle-
gations and report its findings back to the Committee.86
UNLV conducted the requested investigation and filed its report
with the Committee on October 27, 1976.87 The report denied each of
the allegations and specifically denied that Tarkanian had engaged in any
misconduct. 8 The Committee then held hearings, at which both UNLV
and Tarkanian were represented.89 At the conclusion of the hearings, the
Committee found thirty-eight rules violations, including ten by
Tarkanian.9 ° Accordingly, the Committee proposed that UNLV be
placed on two years probation91 and requested that UNLV show cause
why it should not incur further sanctions if it did not suspend Tarkanian
during the team's probationary period.92 The NCAA Council unani-
mously approved these proposals.93
After receiving the NCAA report, UNLV's president directed the
vice-president to schedule a hearing to advise him whether UNLV
should comply with the NCAA's show-cause order or suspend
Tarkanian. 94 At the advisory hearing, the vice-president stated that the
University had three options: (1) retain Tarkanian despite the proposals,
thereby risking further sanctions;9" (2) "[r]ecognize the University's del-
egation to the NCAA of the power to act as ultimate arbiter of these
matters";96 or (3) "[p]ull out of the NCAA completely."97 The presi-
dent chose the second option and suspended Tarkanian.98
The day before his suspension was to take effect, Tarkanian brought
suit against UNLV and several of its officers in Nevada state court.9 9 He
sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming deprivation of property
and liberty without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth




89. IM This fact presumably would have a bearing on any due process decision. The
Court, however, granted the NCAA's petition for certiorari only as to the state action ques-
tion. Id. at 467 n.1 (White, J., dissenting). Thus, for the purposes of this discussion, the
adequacy of the NCAA's hearings is immaterial.
90. Id. at 458.
91. Id. at 459. During the probationary period, UNLV's basketball team was barred from










Amendment and 42 U.S.C. section 19 8 3.1°°
C. Lower Court Holdings
The Nevada state court enjoined UNLV's suspension of Tarkanian
on procedural and substantive due process grounds.1' 1 UNLV appealed
to the Nevada Supreme Court.' 02 The NCAA filed an amicus curiae
brief, arguing inter alia that it was a necessary party to the suit.10 3 The
Nevada Supreme Court agreed and remanded the case for joinder of the
NCAA.1 °' Tarkanian filed a second amended complaint naming the
NCAA as codefendant with UNLV. 05
Finally, after much dispute over the proper forum, the state trial
court entered judgment against both defendants. 10 6 The court specifi-
cally found that the NCAA's conduct constituted state action and that
this conduct violated Tarkanian's fourteenth amendment due process
rights.10 7 Consequently, the court enjoined the NCAA from enforcing
its show-cause order and from carrying out any other Committee
recommendations.108
Soon after the court entered its judgment, Tarkanian filed a petition
for attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C section 1988.109 After additional
forum maneuvering, the Nevada state court awarded attorney's fees of
approximately $196,000 to Tarkanian, and ordered the NCAA to pay 90
percent of this sum. "0 The NCAA appealed both the injunction and the
fee order, but UNLV was apparently satisfied with the outcome and did
not appeal either part of the final judgment.11' The Nevada Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court's decision on all issues except attorney's
fees.112 In upholding the trial court's finding of state action, the court
relied heavily on the public function test.'1 3 The court observed that
"the right to discipline public employees is traditionally the exclusive
100. Id
101. Id
102. I d; see University of Nevada v. Tarkanian, 95 Nev. 389, 594 P.2d 1159 (1979).
103. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 460.
104. Tarkanian, 95 Nev. at 399, 594 P.2d at 1165.
105. Tarkanian v. University of Nevada, No. A173498 (8th Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nevada,
June 25, 1984), available in Joint Appendix at 16, Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454 (No. 87-1061).
106. Joint Appendix at 33-34, Tarkanian (No. 87-1061).
107. Joint Appendix at 26, Tarkanian (No. 87-1061).
108. Joint Appendix at 34, Tarkanian (No. 87-1061); see supra note 91 and accompanying
text.
109. See Tarkanian v. University of Nevada, No. 173498 (8th Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nevada,
January 21, 1985), available in Joint Appendix at 36, Tarkanian (No. 87-1061).
110. Joint Appendix at 41-42, Tarkanian (No. 87-1061).
111. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454, 460 (1988).
112. Tarkanian v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 103 Nev. 331, 334, 741 P.2d 1345,
1346 (Nev. 1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988).
113. Id at 336-37, 741 P.2d at 1348-49.
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prerogative of the state."' 14 Therefore, UNLV's delegation of this right
to the NCAA made both parties state actors for fourteenth amendment
purposes. 
15
D. Supreme Court Holding
On December 23, 1987, the NCAA filed its petition for writ of certi-
orari with the United States Supreme Court." 6 The Court granted certi-
orari to address the state action issue." 7 It determined that the NCAA




Justice Stevens, writing for the five member majority, began by dis-
tinguishing the facts of Tarkanian from those of the "typical" state ac-
tion case." 9 In the typical case, he declared, the private entity commits
the challenged act, with the principal question being "whether the State
was sufficiently involved to treat that decisive conduct as state action.'
20
In Tarkanian however, the governmental entity took the decisive act of
suspending Tarkanian. Justice Stevens determined that this unique situa-
tion required the Court "to step through an analytical looking glass to
resolve it."'' Thus, the issue was not the extent of UNLV's participa-
tion in NCAA activities, but "whether UNLV's actions in compliance
with the NCAA rules and recommendations turned the NCAA's con-
duct into state action."' 22 In the very next paragraph, however, the ma-
jority began an analysis of UNLV's participation in NCAA activities.
First, the Court focused on UNLV's role as a member of the
NCAA. It acknowledged UNLV's participation in the promulgation of
the NCAA's rules, 123 but noted that hundreds of instittitions make up
the NCAA, with the vast majority of the members located outside of
Nevada. 24 Because Nevada institutions had played such a minor part in
114. Id. at 336, 741 P.2d at 1348.
115. Id. at 337, 741 P.2d at 1349.
116. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988) (No. 87-1061).
117. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454, 457 (1988).
118. Id. at 465-66.
119. Id. at 462.
120. Id
121. Id
122. Id at 465. Toward the end of its opinion, the majority rephrased its basic inquiry as
whether "'the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right [can] be fairly at-
tributed to the State.'" Id. (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)).
This is the type of overly broad inquiry that makes the state action doctrine so susceptible to
manipulation.
123. Id. at 462; see also supra note 67 and accompanying text.
124. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 462.
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creating the NCAA's rules, the state of Nevada could not have conferred
any authority on the NCAA.125 Similarly, UNLV's decision to adopt the
NCAA's policies did not transform the NCAA into a state actor. The
Court recognized that UNLV's adoption of NCAA policies constituted
state action, but held that this act did not turn the NCAA's policy for-
mulation into state action.126 Justice Stevens analogized to Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona,'27 where the Arizona Supreme Court's freedom to
amend, or even reject, the American Bar Association's disciplinary rules
insulated the ABA from a state action claim. Likewise, he argued,
UNLV's power to amend or reject the NCAA standards insulated the
NCAA from such a claim.12
The majority next rejected Tarkanian's argument that UNLV's dele-
gation of its power to investigate employee misconduct, impose sanc-
tions, and make disciplinary recommendations rendered the NCAA a
state actor. 129 The Court recognized that delegation of state authority to
a private party may make that party a state actor.130 The Court also
implicitly accepted that discipline of state employees is traditionally a
public function.13 1 In Tarkanian, however, UNLV had retained the
right to directly discipline its employees.132 The NCAA, by its own leg-
islation, was prohibited from directly disciplining the employees of mem-
ber institutions. Under these facts the Court determined that the NCAA
had not acquired the authority to perform the challenged act.
133
The majority summarily refuted Tarkanian's argument that state ac-
tion resulted from the codefendants' joint participation in suspending
Tarkanian.13 1 The Court stressed the antagonistic nature of the relation-
ship between the NCAA and UNLV throughout the Nevada state court
litigation and held that "[i]t would be ironic indeed to conclude that the
NCAA's imposition of sanctions against UNLV-sanctions that UNLV
and its counsel.., steadfastly opposed during protracted adversary pro-
ceedings-is fairly attributable to the State of Nevada."'
135
Finally, the majority dismissed Tarkanian's argument that the
NCAA was so powerful that UNLV had no choice but to obey the Asso-
125. Id. at 462-63.
126. Id. at 463.
127. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
128. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 463.
129. 1d. at 463-64.
130. Id. at 464 (citing West v. Atkins, 108 S. Ct. 2250 (1988), in which a private physician
who had contracted with a state prison to provide medical care for the inmates was found to be
a state actor).
131. Id. at 465 n.18.
132. Id. at 465; see also supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
133. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 465 n.18.
134. Id. at 464 n.16.
135. Id. at 465.
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ciation's demands. 136 Relying on Jackson,137 the Court stated that "even
if we assume that a private monopolist can impose its will on a state
agency by a threatened refusal to deal with it, it does not follow that such
a private party is acting under color of state law."'
13
2. Dissenting Opinion
Justice White wrote the dissenting opinion, in which Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, and O'Connor joined. Justice White began by framing his
basic inquiry differently than the majority. "The question here," he said,
"is whether the NCAA acted jointly with UNLV in suspending
Tarkanian and thereby also became a state actor."'
139
The dissent rejected the majority's contention that the facts of
Tarkanian were unique."4 Justice White pointed to two cases, Adickes v.
S. H. Kress & Co. 4 and Dennis v. Sparks,42 which, like Tarkanian,
dealt with the question whether private parties were state actors when
the decisive act was taken by a state official. In both Adickes and Dennis,
the issue was whether the private parties were " 'jointly engaged with
state officials in the challenged action.' ,113 In Adickes, the plaintiff was
a white school teacher who had accompanied six black students into the
defendant's lunchroom and was refused service. The Court ruled that
the plaintiff would be entitled to recovery against the defendant if she
could prove that one of its employees had "reached an understanding"
with a local policeman to violate her fourteenth amendment equal pro-
tection rights.'" The Tarkanian dissenters found several such "under-
standings" between the NCAA and UNLV.
First, the dissent referred to the Nevada Supreme Court's finding
that "'[a]s a member of the NCAA, UNLV contractually agrees to ad-
minister its athletic program in accordance with NCAA legislation.' "145
"Indeed," said Justice White, "NCAA rules provide that NCAA 'en-
forcement procedures are an essential part of the intercollegiate athletic
program of each member institution.' "146 The dissent also noted that by
joining the NCAA, UNLV had agreed that the NCAA would make the
final decision in any matter pertaining to rules violations. Furthermore,
136. Id
137. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
138. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 465.
139. Id at 466 (White, J., dissenting).
140. Id ; see supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
141. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
142. 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
143. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 466 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Dennis, 449 U.S. at 27-
28).
144. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 152.
145. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 466 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting University of Nevada v.
Tarkanian, 95 Nev. 389, 391, 594 P.2d 1159, 1160 (1979)).
146. Id. (quoting Joint Appendix at 97, Tarkanian (No. 87-1061)).
as a result of this agreement, the NCAA directly conducted the very
hearings that allegedly violated Tarkanian's due process rights.1 47
Next, the dissent observed that "[b]y the terms of UNLV's member-
ship in the NCAA, the NCAA's findings were final and not subject to
further review by any other body, and it was for that reason that UNLV
suspended Tarkanian, despite concluding that many of those findings
were wrong."' 148 Based on the extensive nature of UNLV's grant of au-
thority to the NCAA through their joint agreement, the dissent con-
cluded that the two were jointly engaged in the challenged action. 49
Thus, the dissent argued that the NCAA was a state actor.'50
The dissent next analogized to Dennis to rebut the majority's argu-
ments. Dennis involved a conspiracy between a judge and private parties
to issue an illegal injunction against mineral production under oil leases
owned by the plaintiffs. The private parties in that case had no authority
to take action directly against the plaintiff, yet the Court still held them
to be state actors. 1 5  The conspiring judge in Dennis could have with-
drawn from the agreement at any time. Justice White declared that the
mere option of withdrawal was not significant. The significance lay in
the fact that the judge did not exercise the option.'
52
Finally, the dissent criticized the majority's emphasis on the antago-
nistic relationship between UNLV and the NCAA throughout the pro-
ceedings. The dissent found no reason to set the agreement aside merely
because the codefendants entered into an agreement that permitted con-
flicts to arise between them.I53 Again, the dissent analogized to Dennis,
stating that the outcome in Dennis would not change even if the private
parties had allowed the judge to attempt to dissuade them from seeking
the injunction before he granted it.'5 4 "The key there," as in Tarkanian,
was that "ultimately the parties agreed to take the action."'
' 5 5
I. Case Analysis
A. Majority's Reasoning Unpersuasive
The Tarkanian majority's analysis was flawed from the outset. By
phrasing its inquiry as "whether UNLV's actions in compliance with the
NCAA rules and recommendations turned the NCAA's conduct into
147. Id. at 466-67.
148. Id. at 467 (citations omitted).
149. Id
150. L
151. Id.; Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
152. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 467 (White, J., dissenting).
153. Id.
154. Id at 467-68.
155. Id. at 468.
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state action,"'5 6 the majority simply begged the question. The Court set
the stage for the manipulative, result-oriented analysis with which the
state action doctrine has become synonymous.
The majority's analysis not only manipulated the facts at will but
also analyzed the wrong facts. Despite its declaration at the outset that
"the question is not whether UNLV participated to a critical extent in
the NCAA's activities,"'5 7 the Court began its inquiry by addressing that
very question. 58 The Court's discussion of UNLV's role as one among
hundreds of NCAA members and of its rather insignificant participation
in the creation of the NCAA's rules had no conceivable purpose other
than to demonstrate that UNLV's participation in NCAA activities as a
whole was not "critical" for state action purposes.
In addition, the majority focused on the closeness, or more properly,
the lack of closeness, between the parties as a result of UNLV's member-
ship in the NCAA. The majority examined UNLV's alternatives to com-
pliance with NCAA standards, and concluded that the NCAA's
formulation of those standards did not constitute action under color of
state law. 159 The Court supported this conclusion by stressing the antag-
onism between the parties throughout the state court proceedings,16° as
though this fact alone could protect the NCAA from liability for an act
carried out at its insistence. This argument, however, is peripheral to the
real issue of the case.
The more pertinent inquiry is: How much did the NCAA partici-
pate in UNLV's suspension of Tarkanian? Without UNLV's participa-
tion, Tarkanian could never have been suspended. The NCAA, acting
alone, had no power to suspend Tarkanian. As Justice White remarked
in his dissent, "The key ... is that ultimately the parties agreed to take
the action."'
161
The Tarkanian Court proved once again how easily, albeit uncon-
vincingly, a court may bend the traditional state action tests to achieve a
predetermined result. For the Rehnquist Court, this result is likely to be
a finding of no state action in whatever fourteenth amendment case hap-
pens to be before the Court.
1 62
The Tarkanian Court's analysis of UNLV's alleged delegation of in-
vestigative and disciplinary powers to the NCAA provides an excellent
example of manipulation in the context of the public function test. The
majority acknowledged that "a state may delegate authority to a private
156. Id. at 462; see supra note 122 and accompanying text.
157. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 462; see supra note 122 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
161. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 468 (White, J., dissenting); see supra note 155 and accompa-
nying text.
162. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
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party and thereby make that party a state actor,"1 3 but found that
UNLV had made no such delegation. This finding is incongruous in
light of UNLV's own recognition of its" 'delegation to the NCAA of the
power to act as ultimate arbiter of these [disciplinary] matters.' "', Fur-
thermore, it was an undisputed fact that by joining the NCAA, UNLY
delegated its authority to the NCAA to investigate alleged rules viola-
tions and to make findings resulting from such investigations. 6 ' UNLV
also agreed to be bound by and to enforce the NCAA's
recommendations.
166
Rather than give these findings the weight they demand, the
Tarkanian majority focused upon: (1) the NCAA's inability to discipline
Tarkanian directly,167 and (2) UNLV's power to retain Tarkanian and
risk further sanctions, or withdraw from the NCAA altogether.168 By
focusing on these factors, the Court was able to conclude that UNLV
had not delegated its public functions to the NCAA despite persuasive
evidence to the contrary.
UNLV's imposition of the NCAA's recommended discipline, de-
spite its obvious reluctance and the availability of other alternatives, ac-
tually undercut the majority's argument. UNLV ultimately decided not
to carry out those alternatives, but chose to suspend Tarkanian. As the
dissent noted, "[lit did so because it embraced the NCAA rules gov-
erning conduct of its athletic program and adopted the results of the
hearings conducted by the NCAA concerning Tarkanian, as it had
agreed that it would."' 69 UNLV's delegation of a substantial amount of
its authority to the NCAA is manifested also by the adversity between
the parties. UNLV's suspension of Tarkanian was clearly against its own
wishes. The only reason for suspending him was UNLV's recognition
that it had delegated to the NCAA "'the power to act as ultimate arbi-
ter'" of the matter. 170
The Court applied the nexus test even less convincingly than it ap-
plied the public function test. As discussed previously, the Court ana-
lyzed the nexus between UNLV and the NCAA as a result of UNLV's
decision to become a member of the NCAA."' The true issue, however,
was the nexus between the parties with regard to UNLV's suspension of
163. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 464; see supra note 130 and accompanying text.
164. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 459 (quoting Joint Appendix at 76, Tarkanian (No. 87-
1061)); see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 95, 97, 136-38 and accompanying text.
169. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454, 468 (1988) (White, J.,
dissenting).
170. Id. at 459 (quoting Joint Appendix at 76, Tarkanian (No. 87-1061)); see supra notes
96-98 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
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Tarkanian. Wisely, the Court dealt only briefly with this issue. '72 A
more thorough treatment would have led inexorably to the conclusion
that the Court sought to avoid, namely that the nexus between the par-
ties was so close that the NCAA must be characterized as a state actor.
"[I]t was the NCAA's findings that Tarkanian had violated NCAA rules,
made at NCAA-conducted hearings, all of which were agreed to by
UNLV in its membership agreement with the NCAA, that resulted in
Tarkanian's suspension by UNLV. 17 The nexus between the state en-
tity and the private party was undeniable and inextricable.
B. A Proposal
Ironically, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 74 which has re-
ceived heavy criticism for its failure to provide a concrete test,175 may
provide the pathway out of the state action morass in cases like
Tarkanian. Burton found that the state had "so far insinuated itself into
a position of interdependence with [the private party] that it must be
recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity .... ,,76 The
Court relied in particular on the "incidental variety of mutual benefits"
running between the parties as a result of their relationship. 177
This joint participation, or symbiotic relationship, standard,
although moribund for well over a decade, should be revived. On its
surface, the standard looks like nothing more than a particularly de-
manding version of the nexus test, but it is not as nebulous. Either the
parties receive "an incidental variety of mutual benefits from the chal-
lenged action" or they do not. There is far less room for factual manipu-
lation than with either the nexus or public function tests.
In Tarkanian, UNLV and the NCAA received many mutual bene-
fits from their association with one another and even from Tarkanian's
suspension. UNLV's NCAA membership gave both the basketball team
and the University itself higher visibility, much of it due to the team's
success in the NCAA tournament.1 78 As a result of Tarkanian's suspen-
sion, the NCAA gained a reputation among its member institutions as an
"effective and evenhanded" enforcer of its recruitment standards. 179
This reputation, in turn, reflected positively on all of the NCAA's mem-
bers, including UNLV. Additionally, UNLV gained a reputation as a
school that played by the rules, even when it worked to the school's
172. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
173. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 467 (White, J., dissenting).
174. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
175. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
176. Burton, 365 U.S. at 725; see supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
177. Burton, 365 U.S. at 724; see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
179. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454, 464 (1988).
disadvantage.180
The benefits to UNLV must have outweighed the obviously high
costs it incurred by suspending Tarkanian, or it never would have agreed
to the suspension. UNLV could have withdrawn from the NCAA, as it
had contemplated doing."81 This undoubtedly would have created a
'hardship for the University, but as the majority pointed out, just because
"UNLV's options were unpalatable does not mean that they were
nonexistent." 
182
The joint participation standard is admittedly a high one. On its
face, it is more demanding than the public function and nexus tests. The
latter tests, however, may be manipulated to the point where they be-
come more rigorous than the joint participation standard. Proper appli-
cation of the joint participation standard would obviate the need to resort
to these more easily manipulated standards. In cases like Tarkanian,
where both parties clearly participated jointly in the challenged act, a
court's state action inquiry may end without prolonged inquiries and fac-
tual acrobatics.
IV. Conclusion
Inconsistency has plagued state action jurisprudence for decades.
This stems largely from the highly fact-based, ad hoc inquiry that the
search for state action requires. In recent years, the Supreme Court has
taken advantage of the inherent vagueness of traditional state action
standards to constrict the scope of the state action doctrine whenever
possible.18 3 The Supreme Court perpetuated this trend in National Col-
legiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian.
The Tarkanian Court employed a strained application of the public
function and nexus tests to find a lack of state action. In reaching its
conclusion, the Court focused on several relatively unimportant fac-
tors.184 The majority virtually ignored the fact that without the partici-
pation of both the public entity and the private entity, the challenged
action could have never occured. Tarkanian's disregard of such a key
element demonstrates how easily a court may twist the traditional state
action standards to reach a remotely plausible result. This extreme mal-
180. UNLV's continued sensitivity on this point was revealed in a recent quote by the
school's current president: "'Athletically, we are not a bandit school, we are not an outlaw
school. . . . We've made mistakes, like other people. But we're not outlaw, we're not
crooked.'" Rhoden, Like his Team, Tarkanian is Always on the Run: Success Muted by Scru-
tiny, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1989, § 8, at 1, col. 1 (national ed.) (quoting Dr. Robert Maxson,
president, University of Nevada-Las Vegas).
181. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
182. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 465 n.19.
183. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
Fall 19901 NCAA V. TARKANIAN
256 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 18:237
leability simultaneously discredits these standards as useful tools in the
creation of a coherent state action doctrine.
This Comment argues that in cases like Tarkanian, where the joint
participation of both the public and private actors is necessary for the
challenged act to occur, a court is compelled to find state action. In such
cases, the participation of the public actor is by definition an essential
element of the challenged act. Once the court finds such participation,
the state action search ends. This proposed analysis eliminates the need
to resort to the problematic tests used in Tarkanian and restores a modi-
cum of coherence to an area of law that desperately requires cogency.
The joint participation test would not find an application in every state
action case, but its use where appropriate would be a major step in the
right direction.
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